Role Responsibility
The duties one has for doing various things which come with occupying a certain role in society • Examples: a sea captain is responsible for the safety of his ship; a driver is responsible for the safety of his passengers and other road users; parents are responsible for the upbringing of their children; a clerk is responsible for keeping the firm's accounts.
• Role responsibility is prospective, that is, it concerns what one should do in the future.
• The objects of role responsibility are not particular actions, but kinds of actions, typically involving care and attention to something or someone.
• Roles are determined in various ways:
Given/Delegated The Head of Department gives me responsibility for Open Days; Matthew asks me to look after his cat while he's on holiday Tacit/Assumed Parenthood; training as a medical doctor; being a citizen/moral agent Taken Accepting a job; Encountering someone injured, and taking responsibility for getting her to hospital.
Causal Responsibility
What caused something to happen • Examples: The long drought was responsible for the famine in India; "a shard of metal shorn off the Land Rover [was] probably responsible for tilting the express's leading wheels off the track"; Disraeli was responsible for the defeat of the Government.
• May apply to persons, objects, happenings, failings to happen, actions, omissions
• Causal responsibility is retrospective, that is, it concerns particular events in the past
• Causal responsibility applies to physical behaviours which are causes, including actions, so need not carry with it any implication that agency is involved, or that praise or blame is being attributed (unlike liability responsibility, below)
Liability Responsibility
Who is liable for something's happening • Examples: Gary Hart was responsible for the Selby rail crash; George Bush was responsible for the suffering in Iraq; the tutor was responsible for the student's good marks • Retrospective (like causal responsibility)
• Hart suggests the following three conditions: (i) psychological conditions (capacity responsibility, below, mens rea) (ii) causal conditions (suitable connection to the harm) (iii) personal relationship conditions (e.g. one's employee -vicarious responsibility) A person who satisfies these conditions is liable to punishment (legal) or praise/blame (moral).
Capacity Responsibility
The capacity of a person to be held liability responsible for their actions • Examples: Due to extreme tiredness, Gary Hart was not responsible for his actions that morning; 12 year olds are not responsible enough to baby-sit; Because she was abused by her partner over many years, her responsibility was diminished.
• Concerns the psychological condition of the agent of responsibility, in particular Understanding what law/morality requires Reasoning to deliberate and reach decisions about these requirements Control to conform to these decisions • Can be assessed both prospectively and retrospectively: Prospectively is this person "responsible for their actions"? Retrospectively one of the criteria for liability responsibility • When partially absent, perhaps for limited periods, capacity responsibility is said to be "impaired", or "diminished". It is completely absent in young children, non-humans. In adults the lack of capacity responsibility is constitutive of some sort of mental disorder.
The Relata of Responsibility
A is responsible for O to P Applies to types 1 & 3 -role and liability responsibility.
A. The Agent of Responsibility
The one who has responsibility (the locus of responsibility, or perpetrator)
• An individual (typical)
• More than one independent individual • A Group (individuals organised in some way), e.g. corporation, team, "men"
O. The Object of Responsibility
The thing that the agent is responsible for • Action (liability) or kind of action (role)
• State of Affairs (the dishes being washed, the death of 10 people, the black eye)
• Other beings (people, animals, groups thereof)
P. The Party the Agent is Responsible to
The person, or people, to whom apology or reparation is due (to whom they are accountable) (NB Not often mentioned -emphasised by "restorative" justice)
• The person who delegated role responsibility -I am responsible to Matthew for looking after his cat (even if it's the cat that suffers as a result of my failure) • The victim • The victim's family and friends • The community at large
Reading:
Hart, Ch. 9, Pt. I (his taxonomy) and Ch. 6 (on capacity responsibility) Feinburg, Ch. 2 (on legal and moral liability responsibility)
Responsibility Lecture 2: Freedom
The sceptic might argue that liability responsibility (and hence the associated senses) is not possible since it presupposes the idea that we have free will, and this is incompatible with determinism, the view that the universe will unfold from its current state in only one way. Admittedly, determinism has yet to be proven, but suppose it were; would that mean we must do without liability responsibility attributions altogether? Two different approaches to answering in the negative (i.e. compatiblist approaches)
Strawson: Freedom and Resentment
In his seminal 1962 paper "Freedom and Resentment", Peter Strawson argues against the incompatiblist determinist who insists that we should acknowledge that liability responsibility is a myth, and that accordingly we should give up on some of our practices and attitudes that go with it.
Strawson distinguishes two sorts of perspective we can take to other human beings:
Participant perspective: Attitudes such as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, goodwill, affection, esteem, the typical fare of inter-personal relationships, where all these attitudes have their place, and make sense. These are what Strawson calls the personal reactive attitudes.
Objective perspective: To see another as "the object of social policy … a subject for treatment … to be managed, handled, cured or trained" (p. 79). Punishment may still have a role: to correct behaviour. May be emotionally toned: repulsion, fear, pity, love (but not all kinds).
Strawson thinks both perspectives are familiar enough. We find the participant perspective in our normal interactions with those around us; and we often quite properly adopt the objective perspective.
Strawson's determinist incompatiblist opponent, however, thinks that only the objective perspective makes sense. Strawson's argues against this:
1. We could not live with only the objective perspective:
"A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the human isolation which that would entail, does not seem to be something of which human beings are capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it" (p. 81).
2. Our adopting the objective perspective is never the consequence of a theoretical conviction.
"No such sense of 'determined' as would be required for a general thesis of determinism is ever relevant to our actual suspensions of personal reactive attitudes" (p. 87) 3. It is not rational to adopt solely the objective perspective:
"it is useless to ask whether it would not be rational for us to do what it is not in our nature to (be able to) do … [And there is] the insuperable difficulty of explaining in intelligible terms how [determinism's] falsity would make the opposite choice rational" (pp. 87-8).
So whether or not determinism is true, we're stuck with both perspectives, and hence liability responsibility (and related senses) is here to stay. If PAP is true, moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism.
Frankfurt presents an argument against PAP.
• PAP could find support from the idea that coercion eliminates responsibility.
• Here, the explanation for the elimination of responsibility is presumed to be that the agent couldn't have done otherwise. "I had a gun to my head -I had no choice!" • But Frankfurt wants to argue that there are non-coerced cases in which one couldn't do otherwise, but one is still responsible. (And if this is right, we may need to rethink our explanation of nonresponsibility for coerced actions)
Frankfurt's Examples revolve around the hapless Jones who decides to do A even though, unbeknown to him, had he done something else, B, he would have found himself unable to do B, and would have done A anyway.
• Devious mad scientist manipulations are used to show that in the counterfactual scenarios, Jones would have done A anyway.
• But, reasons Frankfurt, that should not in any way alter our account of the non-counterfactual -actualscenario, in which, intuitively, Jones is responsible for doing A … even though he couldn't have done otherwise!
Frankfurtian Free Will?
So if free will isn't to be understood in terms of the availability of alternatives, how is it to be understood?
The answer is that one must be in some sense, self-determining. One is able to determine how one acts, or even who one is.
Frankfurt's own version of this idea can be found in his (1971) paper "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person".
• To be a person, for Frankfurt, is to be somebody who can have second-order desires about one's firstorder motives (part of an account of capacity responsibility). To lack such a capacity is to be a "wanton" -to be a puppet of one's desires.
• A free act is one in which one desires that one's first-order motives be one's will (one of the psychological conditions on liability responsibility).
Sadly, there are well documented problems with this claim, which Frankfurt himself has had at least two goes at modifying.
Readings:
Frankfurt, Harry G. being an officer in a Nazi concentration camp German citizens' opportunity to oppose the Nazi regime from within -they are responsible for not so doing; whereas we who didn't have that opportunity are not.
• Luck in acts of will themselves: one's will may be determined by antecedent circumstances outside one's control. (In fact, the term "moral luck" is misleading, since it applies to non-moral cases too, including legal ones. Perhaps "Liability Luck" would be a better term?)
The Problem of Moral Luck
A. The Kantian thesis: what is not subject to the will (i.e. within the agent's control) cannot have a bearing on one's (liability) responsibility. B. Many things we do are dependent on luck (see Nagel's examples), and that does not stop them from being (liability) responsible for them. (Our attitudes and actions towards them are justified). But A and B cannot both be true.
Responses An extreme view: responsibility scepticism
This problem threatens to undermine liability responsibility as such (cf. scepticism in epistemology). The thought is that pretty much every action is subject to lucky circumstances -our upbringing, our constitution, our being born in the first place… So if the Kantian thesis is true, none of us are responsible for any action at all! We could treat this as a reductio, or as a nettle to be grasped (but ouch! This one really stings!) Nagel "The problem of moral luck cannot be understood without an account of the internal conception of agency and its special connection with the moral attitudes as opposed to other types of value" (p. 38). Nagel's suggestion is that the problem is a result of switching between two incommensurate conceptions of what a person is:
• an object, subject to causal laws, and chance events;
• an agent, the locus of responsibility • Moral attitudes: (from Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment"): e.g. pride, resentment, shame guilt remorse Problems:
• The connection between actions and events, agents and objects, is left mysterious -a dualism
• The solution doesn't explain why both A and B both seem to concern the same subject matter -our intuitions seem to pull Gary Hart, as it were, in and out of the prison.
Another Response: Kinds of Luck ("If it wasn't for my bad luck, I wouldn't have any luck at all!", Groucho Marx?) We speak of events being "lucky" and "unlucky", but these do not exhaust the possibilities. Some events seem properly classified as neither. I suggest a four-way distinction between kinds of events: 1. Good luck ("lucky") something good happened as a matter of chance 2. Bad luck ("unlucky") something bad happened as a matter of chance 3. Neutral luck something happened as a matter of chance that was neither good nor bad 4. Non-luck something happened that wasn't a matter of chance at all "A matter of chance": two interpretations:
• A contingent event. But as we have seen, since virtually every event might be considered contingent, so all events will turn out to be in categories 1-3. Category 4 is reduced to merely theoretical events (The first cause? Acts of pure will?). This interpretation (Nagel's) does not allow us to capture our ordinary distinctions.
• An unlikely event. A contingent event which, objectively speaking, was less likely to happen than not (perhaps much less likely). Putting an epistemic spin on this, an event it would be reasonable to expect not to happen. This notion is highly context-relative, but nevertheless objective (it doesn't matter who makes the assessment, or whether any such assessment is made at all). This better captures our ordinary distinctions. Example: a novice darts player who throws a dart aiming at the bullseye.
• She hits the bullseye -good luck ("beginner's luck") • Someone suddenly runs in front of the board and the dart hits him and bounces off -bad luck • She hits the board -non-luck
Towards a solution: Reasonable Risk
One of the requirements of capacity responsibility is being able to do what one can to avoid or at least minimise, bad luck. That is, to be able to judge whether a particular action, which threatens bad luck, is a reasonable risk. And we can say that an agent is liability responsible for bad luck if they took an unreasonable risk. (Note that the same cannot be said of good or neutral luck). When calculating reasonable risk one should consider (at least):
• How bad could the unlucky event be?
• How likely is it that the unlucky event will happen?
• What is to be gained by doing it?
• Are suitable safeguards in place?
We can keep A, the Kantian thesis, if we understand the will to be subject to calculations of reasonable risk. As long as we are taking a reasonable risk, and exercise our capacity responsibility for this, we cannot be liability responsible for what subsequently happens by bad luck. The will makes reasonable predictions about nature. And we can nuance B: Whilst many (if not all) events are to some degree chancy, only a few actions result from bad luck, and of those, agents are only liability responsible for them if they took an unreasonable risk. The problem of moral luck is now less pressing, though we still need an account of why we treat people differently if, having taken a reasonable risk, they are still subject to bad luck. This analysis allows us to move the debate about Gary Hart on: the question now is, did he take a reasonable risk? For that is something for which he was capacity and role responsible for assessing.
Reading for this Lecture Nagel, Thomas 1979 : "Moral Luck", in his Mortal Questions, Canto, 1979 , pp. 24-38. Williams, Bernard, 1981 : "Moral Luck", in his Moral Luck, CUP, 1981 , pp. 20-39. Zimmerman, Michael: 1987 
Responsibility Lecture 4: Control
Here we consider one of the proposed necessary conditions for liability responsibility, that is, that an agent has such responsibility for an action only if it was controlled by her.
Alternatives and Control
Recall Frankfurt's (1969) objections to PAP (the principle of alternate possibilities), in which counterfactual scenarios are designed such that the agent (Jones) would do the same thing, even though these are never actual. One might say, however, that if one genuinely could not do otherwise, one has no control of the action. Control seems to have the possibility of alternatives as a precondition. But can we make sense of control without relying on alternatives?
Regulative Control & Guidance Control
In Responsibility & Control, Fischer & Ravizza (1998) are impressed by Frankfurt's objections to PAP, but want to retain the link between control and responsibility. They define a sense of control which avoids Frankfurt-style cases.
First scenario:
Let us suppose that Sally is driving her car. It is functioning well, and Sally wishes to make a right turn. As a result of her intention to turn right, she signals, turns the steering wheel, and carefully guides the car to the right. … In this ordinary case, Sally guides the car to the right, but she could have guided it to the left. She controls the car, and also she has a certain sort of control over the car's movements. Insofar as Sally actually guides the car in a certain way, we shall say that she has "guidance control." Further, insofar as Sally also has the power to guide the car in a different way, we shall say she has "regulative control." (F&R, pp. 30-1) Guidance control the agent "actually guides the car"
Regulative control involves a dual power: to ϕ, or to do something else (either ψ or not ϕ) Requires alternative possibilities Second scenario:
Sally again drives her car in the normal way to the right. But here, Sally's car is a "driver instruction" automobile with dual controls. We can further imagine that the instructor is quite happy to allow Sally to steer the car to the right, but that if Sally had shown any inclination to cause the car to go in some other direction, the instructor would have intervened and caused the car to go to the right (just as it actually goes) (F&R, p. 32).
In this case, Sally has guidance control, but lacks regulative control. The instructor has regulative control. This shows that "one can have a certain sort of control without having the sort of control that involves alternative possibilities" (p. 32)
Problems with Guidance Control
• Can we make sense of what Sally's "carefully" guiding the car consists in without considering counterfactual scenarios? • Since we need not be concerned to defend compatiblism, the cost of holding PAP may not be high.
• We might also have problems with Frankfurt's arguments against PAP.
Intervention Control and Initiation Control
In a later paper Frankfurt (1978) is arguing against the idea that intentional action can be understood in terms of its causal history. He writes:
A driver whose automobile is coasting downhill in virtue of gravitational forces alone may be entirely satisfied with its speed and direction, and so he may never intervene to adjust its movement in any way. This would not show that the movement of the automobile did not occur under his guidance. What counts is that he was prepared to intervene if necessary, and that he was in a position to do so more or less effectively. (Frankfurt 1978, p. 48) This suggests the following sense of control (see also the agent initiates the behaviour e.g. Starting the car; a footballer kicking a ball; poisoning the queen; somebody (consciously) deciding to ϕ does not require PAP (note this distinction may not be exhaustive -there may be other kinds of control besides) Initiation control is neither necessary nor sufficient for liability responsibility:
• not necessary:
Frankfurt's driver, child-minder, habitual actions • not sufficient:
we need intervention control too Intervention control:
• may not be sufficient for liability responsibility: no difference between one's own and somebody else's actions. We need to specify the capacity for a special sort of intervention over our own actions (direct exertion of the will).
• But I think it may be necessary for liability responsibility. 
Reading for this Lecture

Responsibility Lecture 5: Groups
Recall from Lecture 1: I suggested that the agent of responsibility might be:
• A group, that is (I shall say) more than one individual who are organised in some way
Group Responsibility
Assuming individuals can be liability responsible for doing things (however problematic that may be to spell out), we can ask: Can a group be responsible for doing something? (Note that this question could apply to all four forms of responsibility described in Lecture 2, viz, role, causal, liability, capacity. The focus here is on liability responsibility).
Some Candidates:
Team Steve Redgrave, Matthew Pinsent, Tim Foster and James Cracknell were responsible for winning the coxless 4 gold medal at the Sydney Olympics Corporation Network Rail were responsible for the Grayrigg rail crash Committee
The employment tribunal was responsible for awarding compensation Government
The US government is responsible for the abuse of Iraqi prisoners Gender group
Men are responsible for systematic gender discrimination Institutions
The Metropolitan Police are responsible for the failure to convict Stephen Lawrence's murderer Should we take these attributions at face value?
Some Responses
• Error theory: Group responsibility attributions are somehow mistaken This keeps things simple (one might hope) The task: say what sort of error is being made, and why they are so pervasive (not so simple!)
• Reductionism: Group responsibility attributions can always be reduced to those of individual responsibility But are such reductions plausible, or even possible? It seems we need to carry out the following task beforehand… • Explication: Group responsibility attributions are genuine, and the philosophical task is to explicate them (make their implicit structure explicit) Aims to capture (much of) our ordinary talk and legal practice We need to accept a (perhaps daunting) ontology: to spell out the criteria of group identity (organisation), group agency, group action, group accountability… We would like to spell out the apparent relations between group responsibility and the responsibility of members. Is the relationship systematic (prospects for reduction)? Or can no general account be given?
Sharing Responsibility
